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The ICC represents the most significant effort by the international community since the Geneva Conventions to prevent and prosecute horrific crimes of armed conflict. The fundamental goal of the RS and the ICC is to end impunity of any individual, including a head of state, from committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The ICC's principal mission is to provide a permanent international judicial forum in which individuals who have committed the crimes could have their cases publicly adjudicated. 2 Under the principle of "complementarity" embodied in the RS, the ICC is meant to be the "court of last resort," to be used only when a case has been referred to it by a State, or when a State is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 3 Even as support of the RS and ICC has risen, as documented by the increasing number of ratifying States, the ICC is struggling as a criminal trial court. The ICC is stumbling toward justice in executing its mission and jeopardizing its credibility and status as the preeminent international court of criminal justice.
The date of 14 March 2012 will be recorded as a momentous day in the annals of the International Criminal Court (ICC). On that day, the ICC reached its first judgment against an individual prosecuted for crimes prohibited by the Rome Statute (RS). 4 Trial
Chamber I of the ICC, comprised of a triumvirate of three international judges, unanimously concluded "beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is guilty of the crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostilities" in violation of the RS. 5 The unanimous written judgment is 593 pages long, but there are two dissenting opinions by two of the judges on specific points of law and evidence for a total of 624 pages. The dissents highlight a few of the many significant legal issues that must still be resolved in regarding interpretation and application of international criminal law under the RS by the ICC.
The judgment is an exhaustive tome that gives credit to the judges for their thorough evaluation of the evidence, even though they publicly excoriate the prosecution for failing to properly investigate the case and vet witnesses. 6 It took the ICC six years to go from the first appearance of Lubanga, a Congolese warlord, in the Trial Chamber to the guilty verdict in his case. Now the case plods on. No sentencing date has been set and no appeal can be lodged until Lubanga is sentenced. No one knows how long an appeal will take. But, if the pace of the evidence phase of the trial is any measure, then the appeal will take a long, long time.
This essay will discuss the ICC and its importance in preventing and redressing crimes that occur during armed conflict, the evolution of U.S. policy toward the court, and the nearly calamitous first trial in the ICC at The Hague and its ramifications for the ICC.
Historical Antecedents of the ICC and the Road to Credibility
Since its inception in 2002, the ICC has struggled to accomplish a mission that is completely dependent on the cooperation of States (i.e. nation states) yet independent of politics. The ICC was born with a certain amount of inherent credibility from its
predecessors. Yet, it has struggled to build upon that credibility, even though it has enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the international community. Its principal challenges as an institution are credibility, cooperation and politics, and a mission that needs to be tailored by effective prosecutorial and judicial discretion and judgment. There is a strong underlying feeling among those groups that the warrant and prosecution is politically motivated. The ICC warrant raised international concern that the pursuit of justice by the ICC could be a roadblock to peace in the region rather than a solution. 13 Not every State or interested party to the Darfur conflict agreed that prosecution of President al-Bashir will pave the road to lasting peace in the region.
Instead, they fear that it could have the opposite effect and instead serve to prolong the conflict. As a result, Sudan and some States have indicated they might not cooperate with the ICC warrant. In fact, President al-Bashir has traveled to some signatory States after the warrant was issued, but was not arrested and surrendered to the ICC as required by the RS. Thus, the perceived political nature of the ICC and its potential conflict with inherent State actions has been graphically exposed by this situation.
Another issue for the ICC is its lack of functional independence. The ICC is completely dependent on the cooperation of States in acquiescing to jurisdiction of the court, including referral of issues to the court, cooperation with investigation, and adherence to orders of the court. So far, the ICC has been unable to act independently and credibly by compelling compliance as courts do in the United States. It is important to note that States continue to engage in actions and policies that further their interests, not the ICC's. Thus, it is unlikely that the ICC will ever be a truly independent and unbiased forum for international adjudication of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression-although it will continue to strive toward that goal.
While cooperation issues are significant, the ICC's lack of functional capacity has consequences as well. The ICC is hamstrung in the investigation of crimes and the collection and preservation of evidence. Even so, the ICC must satisfy world opinion that its proceedings are fair, effective, impartial, and enhance the rule of law. This challenge is daunting. The ICC must operate across a vast spectrum of cultural, language and geographic barriers and through a wide range of state capabilities to investigate, document, and try the crimes within its jurisdiction. Although it typically relies upon the investigation assets indigenous to the regions and States where the crimes occurred, it also can consider evidence provided by non-State sources, e.g.
individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or news media. Nonetheless, whatever evidence is provided to the ICC must meet the standards of admissible evidence to be used in court proceedings. However, if a State has little or no capacity (or willingness) to support the ICC and the prosecution of crimes that occurred within the State's territory, then the consequence is that individuals may not be held accountable for the crimes they committed and the purpose of the RS will be frustrated.
Fortunately, there are forums for long-term and short-term solutions to these issues. For long-term solutions, especially dealing with State compliance to the RS, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute meets annually to address and find solutions to these vexing problems. The ASP meetings and working groups attempt to build consensus, collective international will and cooperation among States.
Concurrently, the ICC, through and with the ASP, is working to develop capacity in individual States to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate violations of the RS in their own jurisdiction. The impetus for this is consistent with the mission of the ICC to be the court of last resort because it is preferred that each State should be willing and genuinely able to carry out the investigation and prosecution of cases in its own jurisdiction. 14 At the same time, judicial opinions within the ICC, e.g. the judgment in the Lubanga case, serve as compelling guidance for trial practice and procedure issues to ensure swift improvements occur at the trial court level.
The Evolving U.S. Position on the Rome Statue and the ICC There has been much international criticism of the U.S. failure to ratify the RS.
The U.S. is not alone-it is notably accompanied by China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel, North Korea and a few other states. 15 As a nation, the U.S. has been at the forefront of development of international criminal law and was an important contributor to the drafting of the RS and has a long history of supporting every war crime tribunal since 1945. The fact that the U.S. has not re-signed the RS should not be taken as a sign that it will not. As the ICC strives to mature into a credible and effective international From Nuremberg to Yugoslavia to Liberia, the U.S. has seen that the end of impunity and the promotion of justice are not just moral imperatives; they are stabilizing forces in international affairs. The U.S. is thus working to strengthen national justice systems and is maintaining our support for ad hoc international tribunals and hybrid courts. Those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held accountable, and the U.S. will continue to support institutions and prosecutions that advance this important interest. Although the U.S. is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and will always protect U.S. personnel, U.S. authorities are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and are supporting the ICC's prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.
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The Obama administration has articulated a clear policy to support the ICC's prosecutions and provide assistance in response to specific requests from the OTP and other court officials, consistent with U.S. law, when it is in U.S. national interest to do so. Jurisdiction of the ICC, especially personal jurisdiction, continues to be a critical issue for the U.S. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes that occurred on or after 1 July 2002, "universal" territorial jurisdiction over a crime that occurs in the territory of a signatory State, including on vessels or aircraft registered to a signatory State, and "universal" personal jurisdiction over individuals that are nationals of a signatory State, or to a case in which a non-party State has accepted the ICC's jurisdiction. 21, 22 For the U.S., potential jurisdiction by the ICC over elected and appointed officials and military leaders and service members is particularly troublesome. Under the RS, there is no immunity for heads of state or an elected official within a government, even if immunity or special procedural rules attach to that official capacity of the person under national or international law. 23 Hypothetically, if U.S. officials were acting in the course and scope of their official duties, but their actions were deemed violations of the RS, then they could be prosecuted in the ICC-even if what they did was legal and sanctioned under U.S. law. There is also substantial concern that the RS is inherently in conflict with the U.S. Constitution, both with regard to the primacy of the Constitution and the rights it affords U.S. citizens. Yet, the jurisdiction of the ICC over a U.S. citizen who commits a crime in violation of the RS in another country is very similar to that of any other sovereign State exerting jurisdiction over the U.S. citizen for a crime committed on its territory, and that issue is well settled--that State has jurisdiction to try the U.S. citizen in its courts and pursuant to its laws. While both of these concerns may not be well founded, they do exist and may make U.S. ratification of the RS problematic in the U.S. Senate.
The ICC only has jurisdiction over cases when nations are unwilling or unable to carry out investigation or prosecution. 24 Thus, the ICC could assert jurisdiction in cases where U.S. law or policy does not justify or support investigation or prosecution of alleged crimes under the RS. Even though this may be an extremely unlikely event, only time will tell how and when the ICC will assert its jurisdiction. Consequently, this issue has created tension between the ICC and some States, including the U.S., because it is viewed as an infringement upon the right of a State to act in its own interest, or defense (from either external or internal enemies).
However, the U.S. must monitor whether the ICC is being spread too thin. There is a real potential of too many cases, not enough resources, lack of cooperation by States or incompetent cooperation, politicization of the ICC, and/or "bad" results that could endanger its future credibility and the effectiveness. Under the current U.S.
policy, the U.S. provides assistance to the court based upon specific requests by the ICC. There is no restriction on the type or quantum of support that can be provided except that it is consistent with U.S. law and national interest. For the ICC to succeed, every case must be conducted to the highest standard. If it is seen as cutting corners, doing its job poorly or ineffectively, or being a political pawn, then the international community and the victims will lose trust and confidence in it and perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity will be emboldened. Should this happen, the great experiment in international criminal law will have failed. And, although the court may still exist, it will be marginalized and/or ineffective in carrying out its mission. Thus, every State, including the U.S., is vested in ensuring its success, even if that means the U.S. engages in many years of assistance and support before ratifying the RS.
The First Trial and Allegations of Mischarging and Misconduct
The first nine years of the ICC, and especially its first criminal trial, have highlighted the immense challenges facing the ICC. The Lubanga trial was filled with missteps and errors, and even teetered on disaster (i.e. Lubanga was nearly released due to prosecutorial misconduct during the trial). Even with a guilty verdict, it is still an open question whether the ICC will be able to effectively and credibly carry out its mandate. However, it appears the will of the international community shall drive it to become a successful institution, even if that maturation process takes many years. . 29 Due to his leadership and actions as head of the UPC and FPLC, the appellation, "warlord," was added to this list of titles by some human rights organizations. 30 Lubanga was a forceful and galvanizing leader of the UPC/FPLC. He planned to gain political and military control of the Ituri using the FPLC. 31 In 2002, the FPLC took control of the town of Bunia and substantial parts of Ituri. 32 To enhance its combat power, the FPLC allegedly recruited children throughout Ituri. 33 These recruitments included both boys and girls and were carried out by FPLC commanders. 34 Some of the children were younger than fifteen years old. 35 FPLC recruitment of children fell into two categories-"forced" recruitment and "voluntary" recruitment. 36 However, regardless of the type of recruitment, it is a war crime under the RS to conscript or enlist children younger than fifteen (15) years of age in any military or use them in any combat or hostilities. 37 The FPLC conducted a campaign of forced recruitment wherein children were allegedly abducted from schools and villages and forced to undergo military training at various FPLC military encampments. At the camps, they suffered many hardships, including beatings, lack of food, sleep deprivation, and abysmal living conditions. Girls allegedly endured the worst conditions, by being repetitive victims of sexual assault (i.e. rape) or being farmed out as concubines or wives to senior leaders. 38 The FLPC also conducted a parallel campaign of voluntary recruitment wherein the FPLC "encouraged" families and villages to supply their children to the FPLC fighting force. The effect of this recruitment was to provide families with justification for giving their children up to ensure the protection of their village by the FPLC and/or revenge the killing of a family member or relative. 39 Once the children completed their two-month military training they were moved on the frontlines of the conflict-as cannon fodder. Children under the age of 15 participated in battles in Ituri in October 2002 and early 2003. 40 Some of these child soldiers killed people during the fighting and some child soldiers were killed in combat. 41 The children were also used in a variety of other military capacities by the FPLC, e.g. as scouts, as couriers, or as personal bodyguards to Lubanga and other FPLC commanders. 42 Lubanga knew, directed and perpetuated the recruitment and use of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years in the FPLC. 43 However, after international scrutiny of the conflict and FPLC recruitment practices, he issued several documents allegedly prohibiting the practice of child recruitment. However, these documents were widely characterized as a ruse by Lubanga to create plausible deniability and to avoid criminal culpability for the crimes under the RS, even as child recruitment continued. The human rights community pulled no punches in their criticism. In an online statement, HRW stated:
Human Rights Watch believes that the charges brought by the ICC should reflect the full range of serious crimes under ICC jurisdiction committed by perpetrators against civilians. In Congo, this is crucial for the victims and to bring accountability to that country and to the Great Lakes region overall. While the current charges against Lubanga are very serious, the failure to include a broader range of serious crimes has led many victims in Ituri to question the credibility of the ICC and its relevance in addressing their suffering. This has undermined the ICC's impact there. This offers an important lesson for the ICC on the importance of selecting charges that represent the range of crimes under its jurisdiction allegedly committed by perpetrators. 51 HRW then went on to point out, "Of course, the prosecutor can only put forward charges for which there is sufficient evidence. That is precisely why it is so important for In the long term, the ICC and the OTP must work towards the goal of making the case that those states that have not ratified the RS should do so, e.g. U.S., China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Israel, and North Korea. Bensouda will have a key role in this. She must demonstrate that she and the OTP will exercise practical and professional prosecutorial judgment and discretion to inspire confidence and trust in the OTP and the ICC. To succeed, the OTP and ICC will have to shed its political baggage and endeavor to be as apolitical as possible.
The fulcrum of the ICC's future is now. The "Arab Spring," the uprising in Syria, and the continuing humanitarian crises and conflicts across northern and central Africa,
are providing a substantial number of situations of potential ICC jurisdiction.
Appropriate discretion must be used to ensure that the situations that are selected for investigation and prosecution meet the intent of the RS. With so many stakeholders completely vested in the ICC's success, including States, NGOs, victims of crimes, and the international community at large, it is fair to say that all of those parties want it to succeed and are working toward that goal.
Current U.S. policy with regard to the RS and ICC should remain unchanged.
The ICC is an organization that is maturing, albeit rapidly, through necessity. Even so, its trial procedures and processes are still in their infancy and its sentencing and appeals processes are yet to be tested. It is still attempting to interpret the RS, and if the 624-page Lubanga judgment is any indication, there are a myriad of legal issues to be resolved. Underlying all of this, the ICC is attempting to ascertain the appropriate limits of its prosecutorial and judicial discretion and jurisdiction. With those significant issues still to be resolved over the next decade or more, the U.S. should continue to do whatever it can to foster the ICC's successful development into a credible and competent forum for adjudicating violations of the RS. Thus, the policy of engagement provides the best method for the U.S. to affect change to the RS and the ICC.
Ratification of the RS would not provide any greater benefits U.S. strategic policy because the U.S. would be merely one more voting member of the ASP. As an observer to the ASP, the U.S. may participate in discussions and debate and still work to make the institution of the ICC a capable and credible supranational court.
Conclusion
The ICC is an institution that is here to stay. The ICC is going through some severe growing pains and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Nearly 10 years into its existence, it has only recently issued a verdict as a result of its first trial under the RS. The ICC has come a long way, but as a fledgling organization with a massive mandate, it is consumed with working out the Gordian knots in its law, procedure and cases. As an institution, it has a long, long way to go. In view of these issues and concerns, the current U.S. policy of engagement is the best strategy and method to ensure success of the ICC and preserve U.S. strategic interests in the long term.
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